Secularization theory frequently focuses on politics or social issues in relation to religion, but daily life and, in particular, leisure play a major role in the secularization process. The author focuses on the religious feelings of young men and women in Iran, particularly in Qom, a holy city with a strong traditionalist background. The post-revolutionary generation is developing new attitudes towards religious commandments, especially in relation to leisure, and more specifically, music.
official religion and basing the political system theoretically on the supremacy of religion and its legal code (fiqh). Two considerations are relevant here.
First, the ''adaptations'' of Shiism to this new situation have introduced, according to many researchers, a hidden form of secularization. 2 Instead of ''religionizing'' society, the transformations of the political system have introduced a secularization of Islam in order to bring it into line with modern life and the new situations for which traditional Islam had no rules. 3 The new political system in the name of Islam has paradoxically occasioned the reinterpretation of religion according to the secular world, even though this has been done in the name of Islam.
Second, the application of the Islamic system has introduced deep changes within Iranian society, transforming the institutional system: the school and the judicial and political systems among others. A new generation of Iranians has grown up, whose pattern of behaviour departs strongly from the requirements of the official religious system. This new generation, whose culture and worldview are in part the result of the deep mutation of Iranian society after the Islamic Revolution, displays a new type of attitude that is not at all in accordance with the mottos of the Islamic forefathers who promoted the religious revolution in Iran. 4 It is to this second aspect, namely, the new patterns of ''religiosity'' that this article is devoted.
The New Religious Subjectivity
There is a new trend in Iran that reflects the new generation's attitude towards religion. This can be summarized in terms of four types of attitudes. The first is the renewal of traditional Islam in a neo-orthodox way. Many people in small traditional towns, particularly in the desert areas, hold on to tradition, changing some aspects of it but maintaining many of its features intact. They are not politically motivated; they simply cling to an ''Islamic way of life'' that reproduces many features of what tradition transmitted to them. This can be termed ''neo-traditional religiosity''. This kind of subjectivity is marked by the denial of secularization insofar as it rejects questioning of tradition and reproduces what was done in former generations, although some transformations were introduced without conscious recognition.
This attitude is not usually dominant in cities where the transformations produced a second type of new attitudes based on a ''revisiting'' Islam. The transformations in the educational system, the generalization of schooling in Iran even in the remote rural areas, the participation of girls in the school and university system and the high number of students in the universities in Iran (around 2 million), have all contributed to major changes in religious subjectivity, particularly among young people. 5 In a city like Qom, most of the new generation has developed a new set of attitudes towards religion and leisure that are consciously different from the ''unconscious'' transformations characteristic of the first group. The latter is ''nonreflexive'', whereas the former is ''reflexive''. This transformation brings about profound consequences in the realm of the self and its capacity to shape one's religious world. Whereas in the first case, music, for instance is seen as ''impure'' and is not listened to, in the second case, although people feel that music is forbidden by the religious authorities, they agree to listen to it because they have to decide about what is ''forbidden'' or ''authorized'', at least in this matter.
A third type of attitude towards religion that occurs in Iran is based on the rejection of any interference between politics and religion. Whereas in the first case the person is non-political and clings to his view about what is pure and impure as decided by the religious authority of his choice (his marja' taqlid), the second case is marked by some acceptance of the interference between politics and religion, at least as stipulated by the prevailing law in the country. In the third case, we see the conscious refusal to give legitimacy to any law that claims its legitimacy through religion. In this case, we have an individualization that is very advanced and leaves no room to any interference between the two realms, politics and Islam. In summary, the first attitude is ''apolitical'' by traditional bent; the second is ''political'' by the recognition of some realms in which politics and religion can have a common denominator, and the third is one in which there is no room for the religious justification of politics. The latter can be achieved by reinterpreting Islam, as is practised by new religious intellectuals such as Abdolkarim Soroush, Mojtahed Shabestari, Mohsen Kadivar, Youssef Eshkavari, and some others. The most widespread interpretation amounts to saying that Islam forbids the intermingling of the two realms and that one should ''contract'' religion instead of ''expanding'' it as was done after the Islamic Revolution when all realms of social life were placed under its aegis.
The fourth attitude is that of lay people who refuse to accept any religious view as legitimate and who see their identity as shaped by ignorance of religion and not by any kind of recognition of it. Among the people in this category one can distinguish those who are ''lay'' by a transgressive attitude: they reject what they see as the negative results of the Islamic Revolution and they are, in a way, ''anti-religious'' rather than ''non-religious''. A second group of people, mostly among the modern middle classes, are deeply secular.
Most of these categories existed before the Islamic Revolution. What is new is the scale of change among those who used to display a militant Islamic religiosity but who have now renounced it in a name of a secular and more tolerant version of Islam as well as among those who permit themselves to reinterpret religion in their own way, remaining, on the whole, deeply ''religious''. Their attitude, more than the ''transgressive secularism'' or the deep secularism of the new middle classes, seems innovative within the religious realm.
Religious Changes in Iran
Among the new generation of people who identify themselves as genuine Shiite believers and who still do not automatically recognize the authority of the marja' taqlid (the source of imitation: a religious authority, usually an ayatollah, who gives fatwas and religious advice, to believers about their behaviour patterns in regard to the judicial or ritualistic problems of daily life), this source of authority is in many respects probably something very new in Iran, in its scope and its depth. Two decades ago, many people were either secular in the large cities or they followed Islamic rules and infringed them quietly, without questioning the authority of Shiite religious leaders. Now, this new phenomenon has gained momentum, and the change seems overwhelming in a ''holy city'' like Qom, the main Shiite religious centre in Iran for training religious authorities, a city known for its traditionalism and its dominant ritualistic attitude. The 50 in-depth interviews that I conducted jointly with Amir Nikpey (see Khosrokhavar and Nikpey, forthcoming) with young people from all walks of life show the extent of the change in the subjectivity of believers.
A second point is the change in the religious feeling of women. In the past, either they belonged to the small minority of modern middle-class and secular people or they were more traditional than men. In the second generation after the Revolution, the change in their religious sentiment is very deep and reflects the wish to take charge of their own life and to question religiously inherited norms and family restrictions. Of course, this does not happen in all spheres of life at the same time and with the same intensity, but still, the change is there and calls into question some of the most deeply rooted aspects of religious life among men and women. The diversification of daily life through sport or other activities lessens the importance of religion, even in remote rural areas; and this, too, puts into question the hegemony of religion, as the Islamic regime intended to implement it.
Change in Relation to Leisure: Music as an Epitome
One new aspect of the change concerns the practice among young men and women of reading religious books by themselves. This was not the case before, when people followed the rulings of the marja' they had chosen (or most of the time, the family had chosen for them). The Koran was read in Arabic by pious people without understanding it (its mere reading was deemed religiously commendable in the Arabic language whose alphabet is the same as in Persian). Now, the search is to read religious texts in Persian in order to understand them oneself, before bowing to any religious authority. This is the case of this young student:
Question: How do you spend your leisure time? Answer: Mainly books, I buy books like those about Salah eddin Ayyubi, Ganj al Arsh and rather religious books. I try in particular to read the Koran, and this calms me down.
Another way in which secularization occurs is through diversification and the shift of focus from religion to modern leisure, in particular football matches. This young man from a rural area puts it crudely: If it is between the mosque and football among the youth of our district, believe me, they will choose football but then, at night, they go to the religious ceremonies.
A field in which a new type of personal preference is preponderant over the religious rulings of the ayatollahs is music: its performance as well as listening to it. In traditional Islam, music, apart from the recitation of the Koran (talawa'), is deemed impure. This was the dominant view among traditional religious authorities in Iran even after the ''liberalization'' of music in the Islamic Republic, which started with revolutionary Islamic music and then moved, progressively, to include Iranian classical music and since the second half of the 1990s-especially after the election of the reformist Khatami in 1997 as President-''pop music'' sung by men. In this field, many of the precepts of the religious authorities have been questioned by young observant Muslims, in the name of their own ruling: the individual can, in this respect, have a say in his religious life, in spite of the banning of something by the marja' taqlid whom he follows in all the other aspects of his life. In this respect, religious young people are aligned with nonreligious people. An interesting case is that of a young man in Qom whose father is a religious authority. Not only does he listen to music, but he also performs it. He reached a compromise with his father regarding the performance of music in Qom:
I have tried to prove to my father (he is a mollah) that music is not bad, but so far I haven't been able to prove to him that it is good . . . I have agreed not to play in public, otherwise, it would be a hard blow to him. I work therefore in the manufacture of musical instruments and I teach music; and this is more acceptable to him.
In order to overcome the institutional difficulties, he has recourse to some ''cheating'', and the authorities seem to play the game:
What is a problem (in Qom) to the authorities is something called music. For instance, if the word music is announced, it is a problem to them. If we call [a musical occasion] ''chanting' ' [sorud] , this is more acceptable to them. If you want to do something publicly as music, you won't get authorization. If you call it ''revolutionary songs'' you'll get it. Hiding behind that word, you can do what you want. One of my friends wanted to organize a concert. I told him: don't call it a concert, but he refused [my suggestion]. They did not give him the authorization. They told him: call it a night of poetry accompanied by music and we'll accept it. The word ''concert'' is too heavily loaded.
One way to avoid breaching religious norms openly consists in referring to the diversity of fatwas: since different religious authorities have different and sometimes contradictory views on music (its legal or illicit character), the individual is free to have his own opinion on it. This casuistical explanation of listening to music although it is forbidden by some marja' opens the way for personal initiatives.
Another way of questioning the impurity of music is by referring to one's own state of mind and subjectivity when listening to it: since one is not put in a state of such excitement that one might trample on religious norms, the music becomes religiously acceptable. Here, the individual sets the religious norms himself, in spite of the rulings of religious authorities:
In our religion there is no prohibition of music because the music that I listen to does not push me towards calling religious norms into question. Most of those [marja'] who forbade music did not feel the need for it mentally . . . But from my point of view, there is no incompatibility between our religion and music.
In the past, those who contravened the norms about music in Qom did it on the sly, but now the new generation tries to discover a rationale for this ruling and puts forward arguments that tend to make listening or even performing music religiously acceptable.
The problem is the contradiction between personal aspiration and the institutional framework. What is accepted and even authorized in the large cities is forbidden in Qom where the religious authorities' power is paramount over that of the government. This makes musical performance very difficult indeed but it also reveals the new subjectivity which does not retreat in the face of prohibition: A: I didn't say I don't do anything against religion. It is forbidden, but I do it. I couldn't accept that it is a bad thing. Q: Religion says that it is bad. A: Can you tell me why it is bad?
Here, the girl who happens to be from a religious family in Qom and who, otherwise follows the religious commandments rather strictly refuses to submit to the ban on music and asks for rational arguments as to why it should be banned. This individualization is the beginning of a deep secularization in which leisure plays an important role, perhaps more important than politics. In this respect, many young people from Qom who happen to be politically conservative (they don't follow Khatami, and the Reformists in general are culturally liberal). This is one of the facts on which the interviews throw a strong light: one can be politically conservative (on the side of the religious conservatives in Iran) but still have culturally ''liberal'' attitudes towards leisure and many other aspects of daily life. Leisure, here, plays an important role in secularizing religion and in opening up new vistas for the exercise of personal ideas and attitudes. This young girl performs the five daily prayers rather assiduously, follows many of the religious commandments and nevertheless expresses a personal view about matters that were, a generation ago, a matter of indisputable authority for the marja', in the religious city of Qom.
Another young person has the same attitude: Here the norm is happiness, and no religious consideration is deemed legitimate. This radical secularization leaves no room for feeling guilt or any attempt at finding some religious grounds for vindicating music. Another youngster denounces the clergy and their hypocrisy:
Q: What kind of music do you listen to? A: Whatever I find-pop, traditional, rather traditional, I like Shajarian. Among the new bands I like Nasser Abdollahi and I also listen to the singers of ''Los Angelesi'' music. Q: Some say that the Los Angelesi music is banned by religion. A: The Mullahs say this sort of thing, and I reject it totally because these people say something and do something else, and those who behave that way, I don't take them seriously.
Nowadays, as a result of the secularization of the Iranian society, 6 listening to music does not necessarily mean that one is either religious or nonreligious. This young woman from a traditional family who wears a chador in order to satisfy her parents and who says she is a pious person, plays a musical instrument belonging to Iranian classical music and disregards any ban on music: 
Conclusion
Leisure-as much as politics, if not more so-seems to contribute to the secularization of Iranian society. Music is a good case in point, particularly because it is banned by many traditional religious authorities, even in Iran today. Among the younger generation, some people reject this prohibition outright. Others, who believe, rationalize their need for music and establish a limit beyond which religious authority (marja' taqlid ) has no say, and the individual decides what is right and wrong. Some others, although torn by a feeling of guilt, nevertheless breach the ban and de facto reject the religious rulings (fatwa) of traditionalist authorities, even though some may follow them.
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